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█ Abstract Fodor was passionately unwilling to compromise. Of his several commitments, I focus here 
on informational atomism. Fodor staunchly rejected semantic holism for two conspiring reasons. He took 
it to threaten his commitment to the nomic character of psychological explanation. He also took it to 
pave the way towards relativism, which he found deeply offensive. In this paper, I reconstruct the strands 
of Fodor’s commitment to the computational version of the representational theory of mind that led him 
to informational atomism. I take issue with three features of informational atomism. First, I argue that it 
deprives content from its expected causal role in psychological explanation. Secondly, I take issue with 
Fodor’s claim that only informational atomism can meet the requirements of the principle of composi-
tionality. Finally, I argue that informational atomism yields a bloated or unwieldy category of nomic 
properties. 
KEYWORDS: Informational Atomism; Representational Theory of Mind; Psychological Explanation; Prin-
ciple of Compositionality; Jerry A. Fodor 
 
 
█ Riassunto Fare i conti con l’atomismo informazionale: uno dei lasciti di Jerry Fodor – Fodor è stato forte-
mente maldisposto al compromesso. Tra le molte cose di cui si è occupato, intendo qui concentrarmi 
sull’atomismo informazionale. Fodor ha coerentemente rifiutato l’olismo semantico per due ragioni con-
vergenti. Lo vedeva come minaccia per il suo impegno verso il carattere nomico della spiegazione psicolo-
gica e come porta aperta verso il relativismo, cosa che considerava profondamente minacciosa. In questo 
lavoro, intendo riprendere le fila dell’impegno di Fodor verso la versione computazionale della teoria rap-
presentazionale della mente che lo ha portato all’atomismo informazionale, chiarendo tuttavia che non 
sono d’accordo con tre aspetti dell’atomismo informazionale. In primo luogo, mostrerò come questo sot-
tragga al contenuto il suo ruolo causale nella spiegazione psicologica. In secondo luogo, non sono 
d’accordo con l’affermazione di Fodor per cui solo l’atomismo informazionale possa soddisfare i requisiti 
del principio di composizionalità. Illustrerò infine come l’atomismo informazionale ceda il passo a un in-
sieme di proprietà nomiche ampio o difficile da gestire. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Atomismo informazionale; Teoria rappresentazionale della mente; Spiegazione psicolo-
gica; Principio di composizionalità; Jerry A. Fodor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STUDI 
 
(α)Institut Jean Nicod, ENS/EHESS/CNRS, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Pavillon Jardin, 29, rue d’Ulm - 75005 
Paris (F) 
E-mail: jacobpiotr11@gmail.com () 
Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale - © Pierre Jacob 2020 
  Pierre Jacob 
 
20 
I hate relativism. I think it affronts intellectual 
dignity. I am appalled that it is thought to be re-
spectable. But, alas, neither my hating it nor its af-
fronting intellectual dignity nor my being appalled 
that it is thought to be respectable shows that rela-
tivism is false. What’s needed to show that it is 
false is to take away the arguments that purport to 
show that it is true. The argument par excellence 
that purports to show that relativism is true is ho-
lism. So this book is an attempt to take away ho-
lism. Hate me, hate my dog. 
 
J.A. FODOR, A theory of content and other essays 
 
 
 
█  Introduction 
 
JERRY FODOR DIED ON NOVEMBER 29, 2017 
at the age of 82. In addition to being one of 
the leading forces among the naturalistically 
inclined philosophers of mind and language 
of his time, he made major theoretical and 
empirical contributions to semantics and 
psycholinguistics. He was described by No-
am Chomsky as «one of the founders of 
cognitive science» whose «computational-
representational theory of mind has for years 
been the gold standard in the field».1 He also 
regularly wrote insightful and funny, some-
times abrasive, reviews of others’ works.2  
Fodor’s writings have unquestionably 
shaped the agenda of naturalistic philosophy 
of mind and language of the past forty years. 
The time has come to cope with Fodor’s in-
tricate legacy. Fodor’s overarching metaphys-
ical goal was to naturalize intentionality. Fol-
lowing his epoch-making book, The language 
of thought,3 Fodor has persistently committed 
himself to the computational version of the 
representational theory of mind (CRTM). 
This commitment in turn flowed from his 
twofold conviction that (a) any naturalistic 
theory of mind must include an account of 
mental processes and that (b) the best pro-
spect for a naturalistic account is to construe 
mental processes as ordered sequences of me-
chanical (i.e. non-intentional) operations that 
map mental symbols or representations as 
inputs onto new mental symbols or represen-
tations as output (on the model of the se-
quence of computations performed by a Tu-
ring machine). Over the years, Fodor has 
come to see that CRTM ought to be com-
pleted by an atomistic informational account 
of the contents of primitive (or undefinable) 
concepts. 
In this paper, I have chosen to focus on 
one aspect of Fodor’s legacy: informational 
atomism – a topic I addressed years ago.4 In 
the first of four sections, I provide some 
background about some of Quine’s legacy 
that Fodor has inherited and that is relevant 
for understanding why informational atom-
ism became appealing to Fodor. Secondly, I 
spell out how informational semantics is 
supposed to fill a gap left wide open by 
CRTM. Next, I directly address the question 
why Fodor further endorsed an atomistic 
version of informational semantics? Finally, I 
argue that informational atomism faces at 
least three severe challenges. 
 
█  1 Fodor’s deep ambivalence towards 
Quine’s legacy 
 
There are basically two separable strands in 
Quine’s legacy that are relevant to Fodor’s pro-
ject: Quine’s famous ontological dilemma5 and 
his even more famous attack on the positivist 
distinction between analytic and synthetic 
truths.6 I will briefly address each in turn. 
 
█  1.1 Dealing with Quine’s ontological dilemma 
 
Fodor’s goal of naturalizing intentionality 
can only be understood against the back-
ground of Quine’s famous ontological di-
lemma. Quine argued that one must choose 
between a materialist (or physicalist) ontolo-
gy and intentional realism, i.e. a realist inter-
pretation of what Brentano famously called 
“intentionality”.7 Unlike Brentano, Quine 
opted for materialism and rejected intention-
al realism. As a result, Quine dislodged the 
intentional idiom from the austere scheme of 
scientific notation whose extensionality is re-
quired for the purpose of «limning the true 
and ultimate structure of reality».8 Although 
Fodor did not fully accept Quine’s dilemma, 
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it made an appreciable impact upon his 
broad metaphysical outlook. 
Fodor was primarily a philosopher of psy-
chology and the cognitive sciences: his pri-
mary concern was to secure a respectable sci-
entific status to psychological explanations. 
Quine’s dilemma made Fodor acutely aware 
of the peculiar status of psychology and the 
cognitive sciences (a fortiori, the social sci-
ences) in relation to the natural sciences. Un-
like psychologists and other cognitive scien-
tists, natural scientists (physicists, astrono-
mers, cosmologists, chemists and biologists) 
do not explain phenomena by ascribing con-
tent (or intentionality) to the entities with 
which they deal.9 Quine concluded that the 
intentional idiom was unsuited for science. 
Fodor took it as a challenge to demonstrate 
that the notation of science must accommo-
date the intensionality (or referential opacity) 
of the intentional idiom. While Fodor’s early 
work was deeply rooted in the philosophy of 
psychology, his later work increasingly shift-
ed into controversial materialist metaphysics. 
As a result of Quine’s dilemma, Fodor and 
most materialists worried that by endowing a 
device’s internal states with content, they, as 
Dan Dennett put it years ago, “take out a 
loan” of intentionality that they won’t be able 
to pay back.10 As Fodor has put it, «if 
aboutness is real, it must be really something 
else»: intentionality is not one of the «ulti-
mate and irreducible properties of things» 
that could be part of the catalogue compiled 
by the physicists.11 Unless the gap between 
the intentional and the non-intentional can 
be filled – unless one can tell which of its 
non-semantic properties confers onto a be-
lief state token (i.e. a brain state token) its 
semantic property –, one will be drawn to 
the view which Hartry Field has nicknamed 
“semanticalism”,12 i.e. the disreputable view 
that semantic facts are primitive or surd 
facts.13  
However, unlike Quine and the material-
ist philosophers who, like him, rejected inten-
tional realism, Fodor was dissatisfied with 
two features of Quine’s resolution of his di-
lemma, both of which reflected Quine’s own 
deep irresolution about materialism. Quine 
did not really choose between the eliminativ-
ist and the non-eliminativist version of mate-
rialism.14 For eliminative materialists, mental 
terms and concepts stand to neuroscientific 
terms and concepts in the same relation as 
“phlogiston” stood to “oxygen” in the history 
of chemistry. When the concept expressed by 
“oxygen” became available, chemists con-
strued “phlogiston” as an empty term devoid 
of reference. In the minds of non-eliminative 
materialists, the identity between mental and 
physical states, events and processes is best 
interpreted on the model of physical and 
chemical identities, such as “Water = H2O”. 
The identity is taken to increase (not de-
crease) one’s confidence in the existence of 
mental states, events and processes.15 Nor did 
Quine really choose between the behaviorist 
and the non-behaviorist version of material-
ism, in spite of the fact that Quine had first-
hand knowledge of both Chomsky’s linguis-
tic work and its contribution to the demise of 
behaviorism in the cognitive sciences.16 
Unlike Quine, Fodor took Chomsky’s 
work in linguistics as foundational for cogni-
tive science and rejected both the behaviorist 
and the eliminativist versions of materialism. 
He argued for a non-behaviorist and non-
reductive version of token materialism com-
patible with functionalism.17 The net result 
of Fodor’s dissatisfaction with Quine’s ir-
resolution about materialism was that he did 
not accept Quine’s dilemma. Instead, he set 
himself the goal of naturalizing intentionali-
ty, i.e. to try and show that intentional real-
ism is compatible with materialism after all. 
To see what is at issue, suppose that token 
materialism is true. If so, then an individual’s 
mental state (e.g. belief) token is just one of 
the individual’s brain state tokens. To natu-
ralize intentionality is to show that the con-
tent of an agent’s mental state can both have 
physical causes and physical effects. As it 
turns out, it is an open question whether a 
single notion of content can meet the two 
challenges. 
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█  1.2 The legacy of Quine’s critique of the ana-
lytic/synthetic distinction 
 
Apart from collaborative work on seman-
tics (in the early 1960’s) with Jerry Katz, who 
staunchly defended the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, Fodor has fully accepted the leg-
acy of Quine’s famous attack on the “two 
dogmas of empiricism”. According to the 
first dogma, analytic truths include truths of 
logic and mathematics and they are true ex-
clusively in virtue of the meanings of their 
constituent terms (or concepts). Quine’s at-
tack on the first dogma was two-pronged: it 
targeted synonymy and the conventionalist 
account of logical truth.18 
In criticizing the first dogma of empiri-
cism, Quine’s primary concern was to cast 
doubt on the widespread view that there is a 
special class of non-logical “analytic” propo-
sitions, whose truth is supposed to depend 
merely on the meanings of the constituent 
expressions, at the expense of the way the 
world is. The content of an analytic proposi-
tion is taken to depend entirely on the con-
tents of its constituent concepts, i.e. on the 
meanings of the words comprising the sen-
tence whose utterance expresses the proposi-
tion in question, whatever way the world 
turns out to be. In his criticism of the first 
dogma, Quine argued that the best prospect 
for a definition of analyticity is likely to rest 
on a proper definition of synonymy (i.e. 
sameness of meaning). 
The starting point of Quine’s argument 
against analyticity is the division of analytic 
truths into logical and non-logical truths. 
Quine took for granted the existence of a 
“repertory of the logical particles” (or logical 
vocabulary) and defined a logical truth as 
true under all reinterpretations of its compo-
nents other than the logical particles. On this 
basis, he questioned the positivist claim that 
a non-logical truth, such as (2), can be further 
defined as analytic on the grounds that it 
smoothly reduces to a logical truth, such as 
(1), by replacing one expression in (1) by a 
synonymous expression. 
(1) No unmarried man is married. 
 
(2) No bachelor is married.  
 
In a nutshell, Quine pointed out that 
while the purported positivist definition of 
analyticity rests on the appeal to synonymy, 
there is so far no non-circular definition of 
synonymy that does not appeal to intuitions 
about analyticity. 
Quine also attacked the conventionalist in-
terpretation of logical truth, advocated by 
many positivists.19 Quine argued that it is one 
thing to select by an explicit convention a fi-
nite set of axioms from which to derive an 
infinite set of arithmetic or geometric theo-
rems.20 It is another thing to claim that a 
proposition (e.g. an axiom) is made true by 
an explicit convention. He demolished the 
latter claim by arguing that truth could only 
be assigned to a finite set of propositions by 
explicit conventions. As a result, logical laws 
would be required to derive the infinite set of 
arithmetical or geometrical truths from the 
finite set of propositions to which truth had 
been assigned by a set of explicit conven-
tions. In short, the conventionalist account of 
logical truth begs the question: it presuppos-
es logical truth.  
According to the second “reductionist” 
dogma of empiricism, a synthetic (non-
analytic) scientific proposition can provide 
reliable information about the world only if it 
can be confirmed (or disconfirmed) by an 
experimental or observational test. Against 
the second dogma, Quine appeals to confir-
mation holism earlier championed by Du-
hem. As Quine famously puts it on behalf of 
confirmation holism:  
 
statements about the external world face 
the tribunal of sense experience not indi-
vidually but only as a corporate body.21  
 
In fact, Quine goes one step further than 
Duhem and argues that all statements, in-
cluding logical laws, are fallible or revisable. 
Conversely, any statement can also be held 
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true «come what may», if we are willing to 
make appropriate adjustments elsewhere in 
the web of our beliefs. As Quine has insight-
fully observed, «the two dogmas are at root 
identical»: analytic statements can be viewed 
as a limiting case of statements that are 
«vacuously confirmed […] come what may», 
i.e. as unrevisable.22 On Quine’s holistic pic-
ture of confirmation, analytic truths can be 
seen to occupy the center of our web of be-
liefs together with mathematical truths and 
core scientific laws. 
Fodor was deeply impressed by Quine’s 
critique of both dogmas of empiricism. Start-
ing with Quine’s critique of the second dog-
ma, Fodor took confirmation holism to be a 
constitutive feature of the abductive or in-
ductive processes of ordinary belief fixation 
(which he also called “central thought pro-
cesses”).23 In other words, his acceptance of 
confirmation holism placed severe limits on 
the scope of his thesis of “the modularity of 
mind,” since Fodor took modularity to be a 
property of input systems, i.e. the periphery 
(not the center) of the mind.  
As it will turn out in section 4 of this paper, 
Fodor fully accepted Quine’s attack against an-
alyticity and took it to support informational 
atomism. Fodor’s informational atomism can 
be construed as a psychological version of 
Quine’s thesis that there are no analytic truths. 
Fodor took Quine’s argument against analytici-
ty to show that there is no semantic connection 
between any pair of concepts. As Fodor put it on 
several occasions, even though it is a necessary 
chemical truth that water = H2O, you can have 
the concept WATER without having the con-
cept H2O. Even though it is a necessary truth 
of arithmetic that two is a prime number, you 
can have the concept TWO and lack the con-
cept PRIME. Whereas Fodor described his pro-
ject as an attempt «to square intentional real-
ism with Quine’s being right about analytic 
/synthetic»,24 a few years later, Fodor went 
so far as proposing that the truth of informa-
tional atomism could purport to explain 
«why Quine was right about there not being 
an analytic/synthetic distinction».25 
█  2 Fitting informational semantics within 
CRTM 
 
The computational version of the repre-
sentational theory of mind (CRTM) can be 
construed as a conjunction of five theses, the 
most fundamental of which I take to be the 
first one, i.e. the computational approach to 
mental processes: 
 
(i) Mental processes are computational 
processes (computationalism).  
 
(ii) Computational processes take mental 
symbols (or representations) as inputs 
and output (representationalism). 
 
(iii) The contents (or meanings) of complex 
symbols systematically depend on the con-
tents of their constituents and syntactic 
rules of combination (semantic composition-
ality). 
 
(iv) Mental symbols are bearers of primi-
tive or underived intentionality (un-
derived intentionality). 
 
(v) Psychological explanation is both (a) 
nomic and (b) intentional, i.e. it subsumes 
psychological events under law-like gen-
eralizations that appeal to the contents of 
an agent’s psychological states (nomicity 
of psychological explanation).26 
 
Fodor has repeatedly argued that no theo-
ry of the mind would be acceptable unless it 
made room for genuine mental processes.27 
Furthermore, several other of the defining 
assumptions of CRTM — in particular, the 
representationalist approach to mental states 
and psychological explanation (RTM) as en-
capsulated by assumption (ii) — can be seen 
to flow from assumption (i). As it turns out, 
what underlies Fodor’s endorsement of 
CRTM is his deep commitment to a mecha-
nistic picture of the mind, mental processes 
and psychological explanation, where the rel-
evant notion of a mechanism is taken to mir-
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ror the ordered sequence of operations per-
formed by a Turing machine.28 
According to CRTM, the main job of psy-
chology is to supply a causal explanation of 
an agent’s intentional behavior by subsump-
tion under psychological intentional laws. On 
this view, the causal explanation of an agent’s 
intentional behavior is nomic: psychological 
laws are both intentional laws which refer to 
the contents of the agent’s mental states and 
they are ceteris paribus causal laws. Whether 
intentional or not, what makes the laws of 
the special sciences (which by assumption are 
not fundamental laws of basic physics) causal 
laws, is that they hold in virtue of some un-
derlying mechanism. (By contrast, the fun-
damental laws of basic physics do not hold in 
virtue of any underlying mechanism because 
there is none.)  
On the computational version of RTM, 
the underlying causal mechanisms responsi-
ble for the implementation of intentional 
psychological laws are computational (i.e. 
formal) processes. In fact, in Fodor’s own 
version of CRTM, the content of an agent’s 
mental state reduces to the semantic proper-
ty of a formula (or symbol) of the individual’s 
language of thought (or mentalese). Mental 
formulae have both semantic and syntactic 
properties. Mental processes are formal pro-
cesses: they detect only the syntactic proper-
ties of mental symbols, not their semantic 
properties. So although psychological laws 
refer to the contents of mental symbols, men-
tal processes, which implement psychological 
laws, are purely computational. 
Assumptions (i), (ii) and (v) of CRTM 
shed light on how content is expected to mat-
ter to psychological laws and thereby to con-
tribute to psychological explanations. As-
sumption (iii) makes room for the composi-
tionality of conceptual contents: the contents 
of primitive concepts (e.g. BLUE and COW)29 
must combine so as to form the contents of 
both complex concepts (e.g. BLUE COW) and 
propositional attitudes (e.g. Mara’s belief 
that cows are blue or Mara’s desire that cows 
be blue), of which they are constituents. Fi-
nally, according to assumption (iv), any time 
an agent entertains a token of some proposi-
tional attitude with the content that p, this 
agent is expected to stand in a relevant com-
putational relation to a mental symbol (in her 
language of thought) that means p. Thus, by 
assumption (iv), CRTM is committed to the 
metaphysical, or at least the nomological, 
priority of the semantic properties of mental 
symbols over the semantic properties of an 
agent’s propositional attitudes (and a fortiori 
over the semantic properties of the utteranc-
es used by a speaker to express her thoughts).  
One crucial question left wide open by the 
five assumptions of CRTM is: what is the 
origin of the contents of primitive concepts 
(e.g. BLUE and COW), which, by assumption 
(iv), must be primitive symbols in the lan-
guage of thought? For the last thirty years of 
his life, Fodor’s persistent answer has been: 
informational atomism, i.e. a sharply restrict-
ed version of informational semantics. To 
understand why Fodor has willingly trapped 
himself in what he has described as “the wall 
of this cage”,30 it is important to mention first 
the reasons why he endorsed informational 
semantics at all and secondly to see how con-
cept atomism results from his acceptance of 
two controversial conditions of adequacy on 
a naturalistic approach to content. 
For thirty years, Fodor has advocated a 
pure informational semantic approach to the 
naturalization of the contents of primitive 
concepts, to a large extent because he has ve-
hemently objected to any teleosemantic ap-
peal to biological evolutionary functions.31 
According to Dretske’s32 seminal treatment of 
informational semantics, the informational 
mind-world relation is the converse of a nomo-
logical world-mind relation. A token of a men-
tal signal (symbol or vehicle) S (e.g. DOG in the 
language of thought) carries information 
about instances of property F (e.g. instances of 
doghood) if and only if tokens of S are nomi-
cally dependent on instantiations of F, i.e. if it 
is a natural law that instantiations of F (dog-
hood) cause tokenings of S (DOG).  
Thus, informational semantics faces the 
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notorious problem of misrepresentation, also 
called the disjunction problem or the problem 
of imperfect correlations.33 If the fact that the 
concept HORSE means the property of being a 
horse is taken to be constituted by a nomic 
connection between the property of horses of 
being horses and their property of causing to-
kenings of HORSE, then how could any token of 
HORSE ever misrepresent something that is 
not a horse as a horse? As a matter of fact, per-
ception being fallible, my HORSE concept 
stands in actual correlations not only with 
horses (instances of the property of being a 
horse), but also with donkeys (instances of the 
property of being a donkey) seen at a distance or 
in poor lighting conditions. In short, tokens of 
my HORSE concept are more reliably correlated 
with instances of either the property of being a 
horse or the property of being a donkey than 
with instances of being a horse. However, any 
token of my HORSE concept triggered by a 
donkey should count as a misrepresentation of 
a donkey as a horse, not a veridical representa-
tion of a donkey as a donkey.  
To solve the disjunction problem, follow-
ing Millikan,34 many philosophers, including 
Dretske,35 Neander,36 have appealed to the 
biological teleological function of the mech-
anism producing beliefs about e.g. horses.37 
Not Fodor. Fodor38 instead has appealed to 
what he calls the “Asymmetrical Nomic De-
pendency Condition,” which stipulates that 
the correlations between tokenings of HORSE 
and instances of the property of being a don-
key asymmetrically depend on the correla-
tions between tokenings of HORSE and in-
stances of the property of being a horse. This 
is a higher-order asymmetrical nomic de-
pendency between pairs (or among n-tuples) 
of lower-order nomic correlations or depend-
encies. In other words, donkeys would not 
nomically cause tokens of my HORSE con-
cept, unless horses had nomically caused oth-
er tokens of my HORSE concept, and the con-
verse does not hold. Another way to put the 
Asymmetrical Nomic Dependency Condition 
is to say that non-veridical tokenings of a 
concept depend on its veridical tokenings, 
and not vice-versa.  
When seen in this light, it becomes, I 
think, an open question whether Fodor’s 
asymmetrical higher-order nomic dependency 
condition between lower-order world-mind 
nomic dependencies does not beg the ques-
tion against basic naturalistic constraints on 
intentionality, by presupposing the availabil-
ity of the semantic distinction between veridi-
cal and non-veridical tokenings of a concept. 
In short, it is an open question whether Fodor 
can reject the teleosemantic appeal to biologi-
cal functions without begging the question 
against naturalism.39  
 
█  3 Why informational atomism? 
 
Fodor’s aversion towards teleosemantics 
explains why he endorsed informational seman-
tics. But why did he further endorse an atomis-
tic version of informational semantics? Fodor’s 
atomistic account of concept possession is a 
version of what Loewer & Rey have called pure 
locking theory:40 to possess a concept (e.g. ELM) 
is to have one’s brain locked onto the property 
(e.g. elmhood or being an elm) represented or 
expressed by the relevant concept. According 
to pure locking theory, one’s possession of the 
concept ELM nomically depends on instantia-
tions of elmhood, and nothing else. The con-
tents of other concepts such as TREE, LEAVE, 
ROOT, PLANT and/or BEECH cannot make any 
contribution to the content of ELM.  
To understand why Fodor has willingly 
trapped himself in “the wall of this cage,” it is 
crucial to further understand two of his con-
verging motivations, the first of which is his 
deep holophobia, as Elisabeth Pacherie has 
called it.41 Fodor’s second motivation flows 
from his aversion towards concept pragma-
tism, part of which reflects his deep commit-
ment to a mechanical picture of mind, mental 
processes and psychological explanation, and 
part of which reflects his deep conviction that 
semantics is not part of epistemology. 
What Fodor calls semantic holism is the 
view that the content of any of an agent’s 
psychological state depends on its inferential 
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relations to all her other psychological states. 
Fodor has argued that, on the plausible as-
sumption that no two individuals are likely to 
share all the same psychological states at any 
single time (nor is a single individual likely to 
share all the same psychological states at dif-
ferent times), the truth of semantic holism is 
an unbearable threat to the nomicity of psy-
chological explanation. As Fodor put it, 
 
at the limit of holism, two minds share 
any of their intentional states only if they 
share all of them. And since, of course, no 
two minds ever do share all of their inten-
tional states […] the putative generaliza-
tions of intentional psychology fail, de 
facto, to generalize.42  
 
By assumption (v) of CRTM, psychologi-
cal explanation is both nomic and intention-
al: it is supposed to subsume psychological 
events under law-like intentional generaliza-
tions, which appeal to the contents of an 
agent’s psychological states. But if semantic 
holism is true, then no pair (let alone n-tuple) 
of individuals is likely to share different to-
kens of one and the same belief type. This is 
supposed to show that the truth of semantic 
holism is incompatible with there being in-
tentional psychological laws subsuming the 
intentional behaviors of different individuals 
in virtue of the contents of their mental 
states. Since Fodor further takes it that the 
only alternative to semantic holism is se-
mantic atomism, he is therefore led to en-
dorse semantic atomism by his desire to 
protect the nomicity of psychological expla-
nation. Fodor’s passionate rejection of se-
mantic holism was further reinforced by his 
conviction that it also paves the way to-
wards relativism, which he hated.43 
In some of his earlier intentional realist 
hyperbolic diatribes against eliminative ma-
terialism, Fodor described the putative “col-
lapse” of folk psychology respectively as «the 
greatest intellectual catastrophe in the histo-
ry of our species»44 and as «the end of the 
world».45 In much of his later work, he has 
persistently waged a war against a view of 
concept possession which he called concept-
pragmatism, according to which to have a 
concept is to have some epistemic capacities, 
and which he described as «the defining ca-
tastrophe of analytic philosophy of language 
and philosophy of mind in the last half of the 
twentieth century».46  
There are two major reasons why Fodor 
strenuously rejects the concept pragmatist 
account of concept possession as epistemic 
capacities (or dispositions). The first is that it 
is inconsistent with his commitment to a me-
chanical picture of mind, mental processes 
and psychological explanation. If concepts 
were dispositions, then the tokening of a 
concept could not have causal powers. While 
fragility is a disposition of a glass, it is not a 
direct cause of anything. Only events can be 
causes: what caused the breaking of the glass 
was an event, not a disposition of the glass. 
Similarly, an agent’s disposition to behave is 
not a cause of the agent’s behavior. An agent 
can be disposed to act or behave and do 
nothing. Only a mental event can be a cause 
of the agent’s behavior, on Fodor’s mechani-
cal picture of mental processes. What the 
mechanical picture requires is that tokens of 
a concept type be construed as mental par-
ticulars or events with causal powers. The 
reason why tokens of a concept type must 
have causal powers, is that tokens of a con-
cept type are semantic constituents of tokens 
of types of an agent’s propositional attitudes. 
And tokens of a type of an agent’s proposi-
tional attitudes can be causes of the agent’s 
intentional behavior. 
Secondly, Fodor has raised a strong objec-
tion against the view that an agent’s epistem-
ic dispositions or capacities, such as the ca-
pacity to discriminate instances of a concept, 
could exhaustively amount to concept posses-
sion.47 Consider the case of a pair of distinct, 
though necessarily coextensional, concepts 
such as TRIANGULAR and TRILATERAL. Any 
triangle is necessarily a trilateral object. Con-
sider the task of sorting out and assembling 
all the triangles into one pile from e.g. all the 
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rectangles to be assembled into another pile. 
Since all the triangles in one pile are also nec-
essarily trilateral objects, sorting all the trian-
gles from all the rectangles will result in sort-
ing all the trilateral objects from all the rec-
tangles. Nonetheless sorting out triangles 
from rectangles is a different cognitive activi-
ty from sorting trilateral objects from rectan-
gular ones. 
So the questions arise: what difference in 
an agent’s epistemic capacities could distin-
guish her mental activity of sorting triangles 
from the mental activity of sorting trilateral 
objects? What could distinguish one mental 
activity from the other in light of the same-
ness of the assembled pile?48 Fodor’s conclu-
sion is that short of appealing to the distinc-
tion between thinking of triangles (or having 
TRIANGLE) and thinking of trilateral objects 
(or having TRILATERAL), one would be una-
ble to distinguish the two sorting activities, 
whose outputs are extensionally indistin-
guishable. (Exactly the same conclusion ex-
tends to the capacity to draw inferences).  
Just as Fodor takes the alternative be-
tween semantic holism and semantic atom-
ism to be exhaustive, he takes the alternative 
between informational atomism and concept 
pragmatism to be exhaustive. So he endorses 
concept atomism as an alternative to concept 
pragmatism. 
There are two sides to Fodor’s claim that 
semantics is not part of epistemology or that 
it is a mistake to derive semantic conclusions 
from epistemological premises. First, I will 
consider an exegetical question: Fodor has 
persistently called his informational atomis-
tic account of primitive concepts Cartesian.49 
Why? The answer cannot be that Turing’s 
model of thinking as a mechanical process 
fits Cartesian ontological dualism. After all, 
Descartes argued for ontological dualism, 
precisely because he espoused a strictly 
mechanistic account of the behavior of phys-
ical things or events (based in particular on 
the prohibition of causal interactions at a dis-
tance) and he rejected a mechanistic account 
of thought.  
The answer rather lies in Fodor’s diagno-
sis about the underlying motivation of con-
cept pragmatism – «perhaps the worst idea 
that philosophy ever had».50 According to 
Fodor, concept pragmatism is best seen as an 
alternative to the Cartesian introduction of 
the veil-of-ideas (i.e. the veil-of-mental repre-
sentations) between the world and the mind, 
whose upshot in turn is taken to make 
knowledge of the world prey to skeptical 
doubts.51 As Rorty has famously expressed 
the pragmatist worry, «the Cartesian mind 
simultaneously made possible veil-of-ideas 
skepticism and a discipline devoted to cir-
cumventing such skepticism».52 As Putnam 
has further expressed this pragmatist worry, 
what is disastrous is «the idea that there has 
to be an interface between our cognitive 
powers and the external world».53 The sug-
gestion is that pragmatists feel the irresistible 
urge to reject the Cartesian veil-of-ideas be-
cause they think that accepting it would de-
prive them of the capacity to rebut skeptical 
doubts about knowledge of the “external” 
world. And they take the refutation of skep-
ticism to be one of their fundamental epis-
temological tasks.  
Fodor’s response is to reject the subordi-
nation of semantics to epistemology: it is a 
deep mistake to derive semantic conclusions 
from epistemological premises. For example, 
it is a mistake to dissolve the mind/world in-
terface and reject a correspondence theory of 
truth for the sake of refuting skepticism 
about knowledge of the external world. Simi-
larly, it is a mistake to switch from thinking 
«of thinking as being about the world» to 
thinking «of thinking as being in the 
world».54 On Fodor’s view, it is sheer episte-
mological hybris (i.e. a cognitive illusion) to 
believe that by relinquishing the Cartesian 
veil-of-ideas, pragmatists will be able to rebut 
skepticism about knowledge about the exter-
nal world. In short, Fodor heralds his own in-
formational atomistic account of concept pos-
session as a commitment to the Cartesian veil-
of-ideas in order both to keep semantics at a 
distance from epistemology and to highlight 
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his own skepticism about the pragmatist pre-
scription for exorcising the threat of skepti-
cism about knowledge of the external world.  
Fodor’s insightful epistemological treat-
ment of so-called deferential concepts sheds 
light on the second facet of his claim that 
semantics is no part of epistemology. On the 
face of it, deferential concepts are concepts 
expressed by words (e.g. “elm” or “arthritis”), 
whose meanings an ordinary naïve speaker 
partially understands and about whose ex-
tension she can have false beliefs. Many in-
fluential philosophers have argued that what 
enables such naïve ordinary speakers to 
competently use words whose meanings they 
partially understand is that they are members 
of a social linguistic community including 
experts who have a more accurate under-
standing of the meanings of these words.55 In 
short, deferential concepts have widely been 
taken to be paradigm cases in favor of social 
externalism, i.e. the view that what others 
(e.g. experts) think is constitutive of the con-
tents of many of an individual’s thoughts.  
By endorsing informational semantics, 
Fodor of course endorses a strongly externalist 
view of the contents of concepts and mental 
states, but it is a non-social version of external-
ism. In fact, Fodor proposes to resist the 
standard argument for social externalism. 
Typical social externalist accounts of deferen-
tial concepts argue for the claim that an indi-
vidual’s concept of e.g. an elm (or ELM con-
cept) is constituted by what botanists in his or 
her community think and say about elms on 
the basis of two premises: (i) all English 
speakers possess the concept expressed by the 
English word “elm” and (ii) whether or not a 
naïve English speakers who are not a botanists 
can’t tell an elm from a beech or not. Fodor 
proposes to reject the social externalist con-
clusion by casting doubt on the second prem-
ise: it is not true that a naïve speaker who is 
not a botanist and lives in a community in-
cluding botanists cannot tell an elm from a 
beech. If she wants to tell an elm from a beech 
all she has to do is: ask a botanist. As Fodor 
characteristically put it: 
what philosophers call “linguistic defer-
ence” is actually the use of experts as in-
struments; not Marxist division of labor 
in semantics, but capitalist exploitation in 
epistemology.56  
 
According to informational semantics, 
what is constitutive of an agent’s ELM con-
cept is the nomological dependency between 
the agent’s brain and instances of elmhood. 
According to Fodor, it is a mistake to draw 
semantic conclusions from epistemological 
premises: the social externalist conclusion 
rests on an epistemological fallacy, more pre-
cisely a verificationist fallacy. Botanists’ 
thoughts about elms do not constitute the 
meaning of the English word “elm” any more 
than telescopes constitute the meaning of the 
English word “star”. Telescopes contribute to 
securing the reliability of the covariation be-
tween tokenings of individuals’ thoughts 
about stars and instantiations of starhood. 
Telescopes help confirm or disconfirm the 
truth of thoughts about stars; they don’t con-
stitute the meaning of “star”. Botanists’ 
thoughts about elms contribute to securing 
the reliability of the covariation between to-
kenings of non-botanists’ thoughts about 
elms and instantiations of elmhood; they 
don’t constitute the content of the concept 
expressed by the word “elm”.  
 
█  4 Three challenges for informational at-
omism 
 
In this section, I will highlight three chal-
lenges for informational atomism. First, I will 
argue that it does not seem able to satisfy as-
sumption (5) according to which the contents 
of an agent’s propositional attitudes ought to 
be responsive to the demands of psychological 
explanation, i.e., that the content of an agent’s 
belief may contribute to producing its effect in 
virtue of its content. I will then call into ques-
tion Fodor’s argument against concept prag-
matism based on compositionality and finally 
his informational atomistic account of intui-
tions about analyticity. 
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█  4.1 Modes of presentation cannot be Fre-
gean senses 
 
Ever since Fodor endorsed informational 
atomism,57 he has given up his earlier content 
dualist response to Putnam’s famous thought 
experiment, whereby my beliefs about water 
(or H2O) on Earth and my Putnamian twin’s 
belief about twater (or XYZ) on Twin-Earth 
have different broad contents and the same 
narrow content.
 
 
This move amounts to giving up the Fre-
gean assumption that two tokens of mentalese 
can have the same reference and different senses. 
Fodor may still distinguish two coreferential (a 
fortiori two necessarily coreferential) concepts 
(e.g. WATER and H2O) in virtue of the syntactic 
(non-semantic) differences between two modes 
of presentation (or mentalese symbols) of one 
and the same substance. For example, one may 
have the concept WATER , but not the concept 
H2O if one lacks the constituent concepts H 
and 2. WATER and H2O are distinct vehicles 
with the same content. As Fodor has put it, 
WATER and DOG have different contents 
(which reflect the difference between the prop-
erties being water and being a dog);58 WATER 
and H2O have the same content and yet both 
concepts present the same property under dif-
ferent modes of presentation.59 But if two nec-
essarily coreferential concepts share the same 
content and have different modes of presenta-
tion, then modes of presentation themselves 
cannot be senses: they are pure syntactic objects 
without a semantic role. By embracing seman-
tic (or conceptual) atomism, Fodor is driven 
towards one of two undesirable consequences 
or both. Either he must give up the constraint 
according to which content must be responsive 
to psychological explanation, in accordance 
with assumption (v) of CRTM; or he must es-
pouse an implausible view of so-called Fregean 
cases; or both.  
Consider a typical so-called Fregean case, 
i.e., the case of an agent (e.g. Oedipus), who 
has two distinct propositional attitudes about 
one and the same object (e.g. a mug). Sup-
pose that Oedipus believes that the mug con-
tains water. That is why he drinks water from 
it. But he does not believe that the mug con-
tains H2O (arguably because he lacks the 
H2O concept). Although Oedipus’s belief 
that the mug contains water has exactly the 
same content (or truth-conditions) as the be-
lief that the mug contains H2O, the two belief 
states are different from each other because 
one could have the former, not the latter, 
without having the concept H20. But if the 
difference between two belief states with ex-
actly the same content arises from a non-
semantic difference, then Fodor’s own ap-
proach to the role of content in psychological 
explanation becomes hardly distinguishable 
from Stich’s purely syntactic theory: content 
becomes entirely irrelevant to psychological 
explanation.60  
Alternatively, Fodor has unexpectedly ar-
gued that Frege cases are exceptions to psy-
chological laws. In fact, Fodor has committed 
himself to the astonishingly strong claim that  
 
any intentional psychology [...] has to take 
for granted that identicals are generally de 
facto intersubstituable in belief/desire 
contexts for those beliefs and desires that 
one acts on.61  
 
In effect, this claim amounts to the denial 
of the opacity (or aspectuality) of the beliefs 
and desires on which an agent acts. Fodor 
cannot be right when he assumes, as he does, 
that belief-desire psychology is «committed 
to treating Frege cases as aberrations», i.e. as 
instances of irrationality. Not knowing an 
identity is just lacking a piece of knowledge; 
it is not the same as being irrational. In fact, 
the assumption that an agent can be rational 
and yet ignore an identity is built into Frege’s 
argument for the distinction between sense 
and reference.62 
 
█  4.2 Does compositionality rule out concept 
pragmatism? 
 
One of Fodor’s weapons in his war against 
concept pragmatism is his argument against 
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the existence of so-called recognitional con-
cepts, based on the principle of composition-
ality. Regarding conceptual compositionality, 
Fodor assumes – and I assume that it is 
common ground – both that conceptual con-
tent is, as he calls it, productive and systemat-
ic and that the explanation of the productivi-
ty and systematicity of conceptual content 
derives from the compositionality of primi-
tive (or undefinable) concepts. According to 
Fodor’s definition, a recognitional concept is 
a concept whose possession requires the abil-
ity to recognize its instances. In fact, recogni-
tion is merely one among a number of poten-
tial epistemic properties of concepts. Color 
concepts, e.g. RED, are paradigmatic instanc-
es of recognitional concepts. Fodor sets up an 
argument for the claim that there are no 
recognitional concepts based on two premis-
es. The conclusion purports to be broad 
enough so as to encompass the claim that no 
epistemic property can be a constitutive 
property of concept-possession. 
 
First premise: concepts are compositional, 
i.e., a complex concept (or “host”) derives 
its content (or semantic value) from the 
contents (or semantic values) of its con-
stituents. 
 
Second premise: recognitional capacities 
(or epistemic properties in general) are 
not compositional.  
 
I will grant Fodor his second premise. As 
Fodor points out, there are many reasons why 
recognitional capacities might not compose: 
you might be an expert at recognizing pets 
and at recognizing fish. And still you might be 
poor at recognizing instances of pet fish. Al-
ternatively, the conditions for recognizing in-
stances of one constituent might be inappro-
priate for recognizing instances of the other 
constituent. For example, consider Fodor’s 
fanciful example of the Night-Flying Blue-
bird,63 namely a blue bird that sings after dark: 
the favorable conditions for recognizing in-
stances of one constituent are never favorable 
for recognizing instances of the other and 
vice-versa. Fodor’s conclusion is that no con-
cept can be recognitional or that no epistemic 
property can be constitutive of any concept.  
The question is: given the second premise 
(which I accept), which version of the com-
positionality principle could rule out of exist-
ence (primitive) recognitional concepts? As 
several philosophers have pointed out,64 ac-
cording to the standard (or simple) version 
of the principle of compositionality, the se-
mantic value of a complex or host concept 
must be a function of the semantic values of 
its constituents. If one accepts a Fregean 
view of content, then the principle of compo-
sitionality will apply at two distinct levels of 
content: the sense of a complex concept (or 
expression) is a function of the senses of its 
constituents and the reference of the com-
plex concept is a function of the references of 
its constituents.  
Suppose it is a possession-condition on 
the constituent concept BLUE that one be able 
to recognize instances of blue things. On the 
standard version of the compositionality 
principle, one could not have the complex (or 
host) concept BLUE DOG unless one could 
recognize instances of blue things. In order to 
form the complex concept BLUE DOG in ac-
cordance with the standard version of the 
principle of compositionality, what is re-
quired is the capacity to put together the 
constituent concepts BLUE and DOG. What-
ever is part of the possession conditions for 
the constituent concept BLUE must be satis-
fied if one is to have the concept BLUE. If one 
did not possess the concept BLUE, then one 
could not combine it with some other con-
cept (e.g. DOG). But what the simple compo-
sitionality principle requires is merely that 
the semantic value of the BLUE be combined 
(or composed) with the semantic value of the 
concept DOG. The simple principle of com-
positionality does not also require that one 
possess a complex recognitional capacity, 
which is itself a joint product of the separate 
recognitional capacities required for having 
the constituent concepts.  
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But Fodor does not merely accept the 
standard version of the compositionality 
principle according to which a complex con-
cept inherits its semantic value from the 
combination of the semantic values of its 
constituents via some syntactic rule of com-
bination. Fodor explicitly endorses a much 
stronger biconditional version of the princi-
ple of compositionality according to which 
nothing can be a property of a complex (or 
host) concept unless it is also a property of its 
constituents and vice-versa. As he puts it in 
one among many places: 
  
the connection that compositionality im-
poses on the relations between the posses-
sion conditions of constituent concepts 
and the possession conditions of their 
hosts goes in both directions [my empha-
sis]. That is compositionality requires not 
just that having the constituent concepts is 
sufficient for having a host concept, but al-
so (and even more obviously) that having 
the host concept is sufficient for having its 
constituents. Or to put it slightly different-
ly, compositionality requires that host con-
cepts receive their semantic properties 
from their constituents, and also that their 
constituent concepts transmit all of their 
semantic properties to their hosts.65  
 
In other words, nothing can be a property 
of some constituent concept unless it is also a 
property of the host (or complex) concept of 
which it is a constituent. Nothing could be a 
possession condition of a constituent concept 
unless it is a possession condition of the host 
(or complex) concept of which it is a constit-
uent. Notice that Fodor’s formulation of the 
biconditional version of the principle of 
compositionality oscillates between talk of 
“possession conditions on concepts” and talk 
of “semantic properties”.
 
Surely, however, 
Fodor does not intend that the property of a 
complex (or host) concept of being complex be 
also a property of its non-complex constituents. 
But on the biconditional version of composi-
tionality, the property of a complex concept of 
being complex should also be a property of its 
non-complex constituents. By contrast, the 
standard version of the principle of composi-
tionality merely requires that the semantic 
value of a host concept be a function of the 
semantic values of the constituent concepts. 
Whatever the possession conditions of BLUE, 
what BLUE contributes to its host is its seman-
tic value, namely the property of being blue. 
BLUE is not expected to contribute its constit-
uent recognitional possession conditions to 
the complex recognitional possession condi-
tions of the complex concept (BLUE DOG) of 
which it is a constituent.  
Fodor uses the strong biconditional version 
of the principle of compositionality to argue 
that if the constituent concept BLUE has pos-
session conditions ABC and if possession-
conditions do not compose, then it is possible 
that the possession conditions of the complex 
concept BLUE DOG be ABEFG do not result 
from the composition of the possession-
conditions of the constituent concept ABC. If 
so, then one could have the complex concept 
BLUE DOG and lack its constituent concept 
BLUE, whose possession-conditions are ABC. 
But in fact, in accordance with the simple ver-
sion of the principle of compositionality, one 
could not have the concept BLUE DOG unless 
one had the constituent concept BLUE. If the 
possession-conditions for the concept BLUE 
include ABC, then it follows, from the simple 
version of the principle of compositionality, 
that one could not have the concept BLUE DOG 
unless one satisfied conditions ABC.  
To see why Fodor’s biconditional version 
of the principle of compositionality is unac-
ceptably strong, I now want to suggest (fol-
lowing Horwich)66 that it could equally be 
turned against his own version of informa-
tional semantics. According to pure informa-
tional semantics, one could not possess the 
concept DOG unless states of one’s brain were 
nomically locked onto the property doghood. 
But consider the part of the biconditional ver-
sion of the principle of compositionality ac-
cording to which nothing can be a possession 
condition of a constituent concept unless it is 
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also a possession condition of the host (or 
complex) concept of which it is a constituent. 
Clearly, no state of any creature has actually 
been locked onto particular blue dogs (I mean 
dogs with non-painted blue hairs). 
Locking onto a property is, therefore, not 
a compositional property of concepts. If the 
constituent concept DOG has possession con-
ditions ABC (locking onto doghood) and if 
possession-conditions do not compose, then 
it becomes possible that the possession con-
ditions of the complex concept BLUE DOG be 
ABEFG. If so, then one could have the com-
plex concept BLUE DOG and lack its constitu-
ent concept DOG, whose possession condi-
tions are ABC (locking onto doghood). So no 
concept has pure informational possession-
conditions, not even DOG. I suppose that this 
is a reductio of the argument based on the 
strong biconditional version of the composi-
tionality principle.67 
 
█  4.3 Dealing with intuitions about analyticity 
 
To a large extent, Fodor’s endorsement of 
informational semantics as a basis for natu-
ralizing intentionality reflects his mistrust (if 
not his aversion) of teleosemantics. His en-
dorsement of an atomistic version of infor-
mational semantics reflects two of Fodor’s 
further commitments. On the one hand, 
Fodor vehemently rejects semantic (or mean-
ing) holism, which he sees as a radical threat 
for the nomicity of psychological intentional 
laws and thus of psychological explanations. 
On the other hand, Fodor has persistently 
expressed his endorsement of both confirma-
tion holism and Quine’s attack on analyticity. 
It is revealing that Fodor has vehemently de-
nied that the Duhem-Quine thesis about 
confirmation holism (which he fully accepts) 
entails semantic holism (which he strongly 
rejects). As Fodor succinctly put it, «Quine 
isn’t a meaning holist; he’s a meaning nihil-
ist».68 In fact, informational atomism can be 
construed as a psychological version of 
Quine’s rejection of analyticity. Fodor, how-
ever, was dissatisfied with one feature of 
Quine’s criticism of analyticity, namely that 
it confounded alleged analytic truths with 
deep scientific laws, all of which were located 
at the center of our web of beliefs. 
In much of his important book on Con-
cepts, Fodor sets himself two complementary 
challenges. First, he argues that far from be-
ing merely consistent with Quine’s rejection 
of analyticity, the truth of informational at-
omism offers the prospect of explaining why 
the latter is true. The second challenge is to 
provide an informational atomistic account 
of basic intuitions about analyticity con-
sistent with Quine’s critique.  
The core of Fodor’s purported informa-
tional atomistic explanation of Quine’s rejec-
tion of analyticity rests on two assumptions, 
the first of which is the following version of 
informational atomism. The fact that the 
concept DOG means the property dog can be 
said to be constituted by a nomic correlation 
between two properties of individual dogs 
themselves: dogs are instances of the proper-
ty of being a dog and they are also instances of 
the property of being regular causes of actual 
and possible DOG tokenings in human brains. 
Fodor’s second informational semantic as-
sumption is the dissociation between concep-
tual or semantic and metaphysical necessity. 
Informational atomism precludes that pos-
session of the concept ANIMAL is a necessary 
semantic condition for possessing the con-
cept DOG. However, informational atomism 
is consistent with the fact that instances of 
the property of being a dog should also be in-
stances of the property of being an animal, in 
virtue of some zoological or even metaphysi-
cal nomic relation between properties. Thus, 
on the assumption that informational atom-
ism is true, possession of the concept DOG is 
secured by the fact that dogs are instances of 
a pair of properties.  
In short, what generates the illusion of 
there being some analytic connection between 
the pair of concepts DOG and ANIMAL is the 
confusion between semantic and zoological 
(or metaphysical) necessity. One deep ques-
tion is the scope and limits of the dissociation 
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between semantic and other necessities. 
Furthermore, Fodor also argues that in-
formational atomism can account for our in-
tuitions about the analyticity of e.g. “all bach-
elors are unmarried men” without acknowl-
edging a semantic relation between the pair 
of concepts BACHELOR and UNMARRIED 
MAN.69 Fodor’s starting point is some early 
work by Putnam, in which Putnam agreed 
with much of Quine’s critique of the two 
dogmas of empiricism. In particular, Putnam 
agreed with Quine that the concept of analyt-
icity cannot “do any of the heavy duty epis-
temological work or metaphysical work” 
(about e.g. a priori knowledge and necessary 
truths) that the positivists thought it could 
(as Fodor puts it).70 But Putnam also argued 
against Quine that “all bachelors are unmar-
ried men” nonetheless expresses an analytic 
truth. Putnam proposed in particular to ac-
count for the analyticity of “all bachelors are 
unmarried men” by turning the semantic re-
lation between the concepts BACHELOR and 
UNMARRIED MAN into a monadic property of 
the concept BACHELOR, namely the property 
of being a one-criterion concept.71 To say that 
BACHELOR is a one-criterion concept is to say 
that there is one and only one way of telling 
whether an individual male is a bachelor, 
namely by checking whether he falls under 
the concept UNMARRIED MAN.  
As Fodor acknowledges, Putnam’s one-
criterion proposal happily disentangles ana-
lyticity from the genuine centrality of deep 
mathematical truths and scientific laws in the 
web of our beliefs. On the one-criterion pro-
posal, the analyticity of a proposition is con-
sistent with its being located at the periphery 
of our web of beliefs. However, Fodor raises 
an objection – which he attributes to Jerry 
Katz (at the time when both Fodor and Katz 
were students of Putnam at Princeton) – 
against Putnam’s one-criterion proposal, 
namely that it could only work if one could 
count criteria.72 Is BACHELOR a one-criterion 
concept because the only way of telling 
whether an individual instantiates bachelor-
hood is by checking whether the same indi-
vidual falls under UNMARRIED MAN? Or else 
is it a two-criteria concept because another 
way to tell whether an individual instantiates 
bachelorhood is by checking whether he falls 
under UNWED MAN? It all depends on wheth-
er “unmarried” and “unwed” are synony-
mous. But Fodor takes Quine to have un-
dermined the prospect for a non-circular ac-
count of synonymy.  
In order to preserve the semantic disconnec-
tion between concepts, Fodor (who of course 
assumes that semantics isn’t part of episte-
mology) proposes to convert Putnam’s seman-
tic proposal into an epistemic (or epistemolog-
ical) one. What looks like a putative semantic 
relation between a pair of concepts, C and C*, 
should really be construed as the unique epis-
temic contribution of concept C* in mediating 
the access from concept C to the property ex-
pressed (or represented) by C and conversely. 
If and when concept C is embedded within a 
rich nomological theory, the path from C to 
the property expressed and conversely is un-
likely to be mediated by a single other con-
cept, as shown for example, by the access from 
DOG to doghood or from WATER to water-
hood and conversely. When there is no unique 
likely epistemic intermediary, the intuition of 
analyticity dissolves. By contrast, our intuition 
that “all bachelors are unmarried men” ex-
presses an analytic truth reflects the fact that 
concept C*, UNMARRIED MALE, is likely to be 
the unique epistemic intermediary between 
concept C, BACHELOR, and the property being 
a bachelor. In short, Fodor’s purported expla-
nation of intuitions of analyticity is consistent 
with Quine’s denial of analyticity because it 
does not appeal to any semantic connection 
between concepts C and C*.  
Informational atomism precludes the ex-
istence of a semantic connection between 
BACHELOR and UNMARRIED MAN. An infor-
mational atomistic account is committed in-
stead to the claim that BACHELOR is consti-
tuted by nomological or nomic relations be-
tween instances of bachelorhood and token-
ings of BACHELOR. In other words, instances 
of bachelorhood must cause tokenings of 
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BACHELOR in virtue of some natural law that 
subsumes every such causal relation. 
It is truistic that bachelors are instances of 
the property of being a bachelor. What is far 
from truistic, however, is whether there is or 
could be a nomic correlation between the 
property of being a bachelor and tokens of 
BACHELOR such that instances of the proper-
ty of being a bachelor could cause tokenings 
of BACHELOR in human brains, in virtue of 
some natural law. It is, I think, unlikely that 
instances of the property of being a bachelor 
could be causally efficacious, i.e. could cause 
some effect in virtue of some natural law, in-
cluding the tokening of the concept BACHE-
LOR in human brains. I do not deny that in-
stances of the property of being a bachelor are 
likely to cause tokenings of the concept 
BACHELOR in human brains. What I wish to 
cast doubt on is the claim that instances of 
the property of being a bachelor could cause 
tokenings of BACHELOR in virtue of being in-
stances of the property of being a bachelor or 
in virtue of the nomicity of this property.  
The property expressed by the English 
word “bachelor” is like properties expressed 
by such English words as “married”, “di-
vorced” or “widow”: it is a legal or legalistic 
property, not a nomic property. The fact that 
such a property is being instantiated gives 
rights and obligations to its instances. But it is 
not causally efficacious in the physical pro-
cess whereby an individual who instantiates 
it causes some change for two conspiring rea-
sons: the first of which is that legal properties 
are not causally efficacious in genuine chang-
es. Secondly, a human male can only satisfy 
the English predicate “bachelor” if he lacks 
(not if he instantiates) the legal property of 
being married.  
To see why legal properties are unlikely to 
be causally efficacious in genuine changes, 
consider Xantippe, Socrates’s wife. At the 
very time Socrates died as a result of his 
drinking the hemlock, Xantippe instantly be-
came a widow. Whatever the distance be-
tween Xantippe’s and Socrates’s bodies, at 
the very instant Socrates passed away, she in-
stantly acquired the property of being a wid-
ow, in violation of the relativistic principle 
that no signal could travel faster than the 
speed of light. Socrates’s drinking the hem-
lock caused a genuine change in Socrates, not 
in Xantippe. The change whereby Xantippe 
instantly acquired the property of being a 
widow upon Socrates’s death can be called a 
mere Cambridge change as Geach called these 
spurious changes.73 Socrates’s death did not 
cause Xantippe to become a widow. Socra-
tes’s death and Xantippe’s becoming a widow 
are not two distinct events, but a single event 
under two distinct descriptions. 
Nor could the fact that Xantippe instanti-
ates the property of being a widow cause a 
genuine change, including the tokenings of 
WIDOW in human brains, in virtue of the fact 
that she instantiates this property. What is 
likely to cause the tokening of WIDOW in a 
human brain is the agent’s derivation of a 
conclusion from a pair of beliefs (or premis-
es), i.e. the belief that Socrates died and the 
belief that Xantippe was Socrates’s wife. Sim-
ilarly, the fact that an individual instantiates 
the property of being a bachelor could not 
nomically cause the tokenings of BACHELOR 
in human brains, i.e. in virtue of the fact that 
the relevant individual instantiates the prop-
erty of being a bachelor. Before Socrates was 
married to Xantippe, he was a bachelor. 
When he got married, he instantly changed: 
he lost the property of being a bachelor. This 
change, whereby Socrates instantly turned 
from being a bachelor into being married, is a 
mere Cambridge change, not a genuine 
change. The fact that Socrates instantiated 
the property being a bachelor played no caus-
al role in this mere Cambridge change be-
cause no genuine causal interaction underlies 
a Cambridge change. Socrates’s losing the 
property of being a bachelor and his getting 
married to Xantippe are not two distinct 
events, but a single event under two distinct 
descriptions.  
Without appealing to Geach’s terminolo-
gy, Fodor recognized the distinction between 
genuine and spurious changes when he creat-
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ed the following pair of predicates:74 any par-
ticle in the universe satisfies the predicate “is 
an H-particle at t” if and only if a particular 
dime in his pocket is head-up at t; and it sat-
isfies the predicate “is a T-particle at t” if and 
only if the very same dime in his pocket is 
tails-up at t. Thus, by handling the dime in 
his pocket, Fodor could change the state of 
every particle in the universe from being a T-
particle at t to being an H-particle at t+1 and 
conversely. Clearly, the properties expressed 
by the pair of predicates invented by Fodor 
could not be nomic properties. 
Furthermore, even if one rejects Geach’s 
distinction between genuine and mere Cam-
bridge (or spurious) changes, it is odd to ac-
cept the claim that the fact that an individual 
fails to meet some condition or lacks some 
property (e.g. being married) could be meta-
physically construed as the fact that the indi-
vidual instantiates a nomic property. There 
are many predicates of natural languages 
(“bald”, “empty”, “hole” or “shadow”) that 
can only be satisfied if the relevant entities 
lack some definite property, a fortiori if they 
lack some nomic property. Other predicates 
of natural languages (“witch”, “unicorn” or 
“mermaid”) fail to express a genuine proper-
ty because nothing can satisfy these predi-
cates. Failing to instantiate some genuine 
property should not be confused with instan-
tiating a genuine negative property, let alone 
a nomic negative property.  
Thus, I grant that bachelors instantiate 
two properties: the property of being a bache-
lor and the property of being causes of token-
ings of BACHELOR in human brains. But I de-
ny that there is a nomic relation between 
these two properties. I deny that bachelors 
could cause tokenings of BACHELOR in hu-
man brains in virtue of a nomic relation be-
tween instances of the property being a bach-
elor and tokens of BACHELOR. Rather, a to-
kening of BACHELOR in an agent’s brain is 
likely to be the outcome of the agent’s con-
joining her belief or knowledge about the 
marital status of a bachelor together with her 
knowledge of the meaning of the English 
word “bachelor” or alternatively of the se-
mantic relation between UNMARRIED MAN 
and BACHELOR.  
In short, Fodor commits himself to an un-
compromised informational atomistic treat-
ment of BACHELOR for the purpose of denying 
that BACHELOR and UNMARRIED MAN are se-
mantically related, in accordance with Quine’s 
rejection of the analyticity of the truth ex-
pressed by “all bachelors are unmarried.” 
Fodor also extends his informational atomistic 
account to concepts of weekdays, such as 
TUESDAY and is willing to deny that “Tues-
days precede Wednesdays” expresses an ana-
lytic truth. He further argues that one could 
have the concept TWO without having the 
concept PRIME. But what about the converse? 
Could one really have the concept PRIME and 
lack other numerical concepts, e.g. TWO?  
Fodor is willing to trade wild metaphysi-
cal necessary relations between pairs of prop-
erties for the denial of analyticity. For exam-
ple, he is ready to construe the relation be-
tween being a bachelor and being an unmar-
ried male or between being a Tuesday and be-
ing the day before Wednesday as a metaphysi-
cally necessary relation between pairs of 
properties. Fodor is thus committed to the 
very strong assumptions that being a bachelor 
and being a Tuesday are nomic properties 
whose instances could cause the tokenings of 
the corresponding concepts in human brains 
in virtue of a natural law. I am not willing to 
go that far for the sake of denying analyticity.  
My own suggestion is to remove legal 
concepts and concepts for weekdays from the 
scope of informational semantics. Possession 
of legal concepts (e.g. BACHELOR) or con-
cepts for weekdays (e.g. TUESDAY) is not 
supported by nomic correlations between 
brain states and instances of the correspond-
ing properties. Knowledge of some natural 
language is necessary for having such con-
cepts. The possession of such concepts is 
supported by knowledge of the semantic 
connections between the meanings of the rel-
evant legal words and words standing for 
weekdays in various natural languages (e.g. 
  Pierre Jacob 
 
36 
Italian, English or Swahili). Granting such 
semantic relations is to grant the existence of 
corresponding analytic truths. I may be 
wrong, but I doubt that granting them would 
threaten the nomicity of psychological expla-
nation (or pave the way for relativism).  
 
█  5 Concluding remarks 
 
Fodor was passionately unwilling to com-
promise. For example, he famously embraced 
what came to be known as “mad dog nativ-
ism,” which, as he was aware, many others 
took to be preposterous.75 Similarly, he em-
braced full informational atomism, in ac-
cordance with Quine’s rejection of the ana-
lytic/synthetic distinction. He embraced full 
informational atomism, because he passion-
ately rejected semantic holism. He passion-
ately rejected semantic holism, because he 
took it to be not only incompatible with the 
nomicity of psychological explanation, but 
also to pave the way for relativism, which he 
found offensive. 
Dan Dennett once compared Jerry Fodor 
to a trampoline: «you jump on him and he 
springs back, presenting claims twice as 
trenchant and outrageous».76 I do not disa-
gree with Dennett, but I prefer to put it this 
way: there is a lot to learn from disagreeing 
with Fodor. I disagree with Fodor’s commit-
ment to informational atomism on three 
grounds. I do not think that it can satisfy the 
Fodorian requirement that content matters 
to psychological explanation. I do not think 
that only informational atomism is con-
sistent with the principle of compositionality. 
Finally, I think that informational atomism 
bloats the category of nomic properties. 
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